| |
|
[Shaw]
We (technicians) really don't
have the answers, but our craft (technical
analysis)
allows us to ask questions and establish mindsets to
prepare for possible future market events. |
[Mark
Twain] "History doesn't repeat itself, it rhymes".
One should always remember that similarities may exist between various
episodes, but each experience is different to some extent. |
[Federal
Reserve Bank of New York] "Technical analysis, the
prediction of price movements based on past price movements, has
been shown to generate statistically significant profits despite
its incompatibility with most economists' notions of efficient markets..."
(Osler and Chang, Staff Report No. 4, 1995). |
[Hussman]
One of the key elements of a sound investment approach is the recognition
that market action conveys information. The best
indicators of oncoming economic conditions are not statistics such
as employment, GDP or industrial production, but market action reflected
through risk spreads (the difference in yields between risky corporate
bonds and default-free Treasuries), stock prices, currency markets,
yield curves, and other forward-looking indicators. That said, investors
put themselves in jeopardy when they rely on any indicator or model
without a firm understanding of why it should be useful, and the
mechanism behind it. Investment decisions made without this understanding
are not based on analysis, but on superstition. |
[Edwards
and Magee] "The market price reflects not only the differing
fears and guesses and moods, rational and irrational, of hundreds
of potential buyers and sellers, but it also reflects their needs
and resources - in total, factors which defy analysis and
for which no statistics are obtainable. These are nevertheless all
synthesized, weighted and finally expressed in the one precise figure
at which a buyer and seller get together and make a deal. The
resulting price is the only figure that counts. It is futile
to assign an intrinsic value to a stock certificate. One share of
US Steel, for example, was worth $261 in the early fall of 1929,
but you could buy it for only $22 in June 1932. By March 1937 it
was selling for $126 and just one year later for $38. This sort
of thing, this wide divergence between presumed value and intrinsic
value, is not the exception, it is the rule, it is going on all
the time. The fact is that the real value of US Steel is determined
at any give time solely, definitely and inexorably by supply and
demand, which are accurately reflected in the transactions consummated
on the floor of the exchange". |
[Dolefin]
"It is crucial to keep in mind that Technical Analysis is not
an exact science. Rather, TA deals with probability distributions
and as such leaves room for unexpected counterproductive outcomes.
This means that a strict and rigorous discipline is a must in the
practical use of technical analysis. The advantage of TA in contrast
to the fundamental approach is that the decision of maintaining
or abandoning an active scenario depends on rather exact criteria
that can improve or deteriorate decisively with every single price
change. It is not necessary to wait for the outcome of fundamental
figures that are already out-of-date at the time of their release". |
[Bill
Miller] "There was some interesting work by a scientist
named Blake Lebaron, who was affiliated with the Santa Fe Institute.
About ten years ago, he studied
a number of technical trading rules. Most market professionals,
value investors and finance professors think that technical trading
doesn't work. If it did work, then there should be a lot of technical
traders who are making a lot of money, but it is very difficult
to find many of these people. Blake found that there were some technical
trading rules (not very many) that worked. The most powerful of
these was Simple Moving Averages. He published this in a very well-known
paper. About two or three years ago, a few academics decided to
re-look at Lebaron's work in light of new developments in statistics
since his time. They wanted to test his methodology using the latest
statistical tools. Lo and behold, his methodology and data all checked
out! They decided to update his study to today. When they looked
at the more recent data, however, they discovered that his technique
stopped working about a month after he published it. They went on
to test roughly 1,100 technical trading rules and discovered that
not one of them produced any excess returns. Markets are remarkably
efficient". |
[Shaw]
Success in the stock market comes by minimizing risk.
But, unfortunately, many look at the market from the viewpoint
of reward only, sometimes taking unnecessary risk to achieve it.
Buying a stock with apparent strong fundamentals and little regard
for the stock's technical position can easily result in a quick
loss. Many stocks can "top-out" when, as the saying
goes, "business couldn't be better". On the other hand,
undue risk is also taken when making a commitment strictly on
technical grounds. Many good-looking stocks have fallen out of
so-called base formations due to an unexpected poor earnings report.
Therefore it seems logical that a combination of both types of
securities analysis should result in better decision making and
the results that follow. Since technical analysis is primarily
a timing tool, it could be said that fundamental analysis represents
the "what" input, while technical analysis
is the "when". (Warren
Buffet had noted as early as in 1966: "The course of the
stock market will determine, to a great degree, when we will be
right, but the accuracy of our analysis of the company will largely
determine whether we will be right", oded)
Cutting losses
short is crucial for long-term investment success. We
have often referred to a simple philosophy whereby we look at
our decision making as an exercise that can result in only one
of five eventual outcomes. We can experience an unchanged position,
a large profit, large loss, small profit, or a small loss. If
we can possibly eliminate one of these outcomes, obviously the
large loss, then we are merely left with the other four. Over
a number of years the small profits, losses and unchanged positions
will "offset" each other. Therefore we are left with
the enjoyment of occasionally booking the large profit. Many technical
methods can be employed as long-term disciplines to guard against
the large loss. We are sure that other analytical inputs can be
loss-inhibiting procedures as well, but the author believes the
technical approach seems to lend itself quite readily to such
an application.
Technical
analysis is based upon the study of supply and demand, or the
price movements within the general stock (or other) market's framework.
Although the market is, of course, concerned with day-to-day business
developments and worldwide news events, it is primarily
concerned with future expectations. In this regard,
the market is therefore looked at as more of a barometer than
a thermometer. Specifically, it has not been uncommon to witness
a stock rising in a viable uptrend when current news
concerning the company is not all that positive. By the same token,
one can witness a stock initiate a major downtrend while earnings
are most favorable. To carry our thesis a step further, it would
be most uncommon to witness a stock begin a major upside just
before earnings start to deteriorate. The reverse oddity
would occur if a stock commenced a major downtrend just before
earnings began to show substantial recovery.
The technical study
of price in evaluating the force of supply and demand does not
immediately presents the reason why a trends exists. Since
the market is a discounting mechanism, those
reasons are unlikely to clearly emerge until many months, even
years, later (Historically, the equity market tends to lead, improving
in advance of the economy. Over the past 80 years, the Dow Jones
Index has bottomed from 3 to 9 months ahead of an economic recovery.
The average lead time for the Dow to turn up before the end of
recessions has been 5.2 months).
Let us review what
we consider to be the three basic and necessary assumptions
regarding technical analysis:
Assumption 1: In
Price there is Knowledge
The market and/or an individual stock acts like a barometer rather
than a thermometer. Events are usually discounted in advance with
movements likely the result of "informed" (not to be
confused with an insider) buyers and sellers at work. We should
never forget, as we explore the technical implications of market
analysis, that the price formations or patterns (as they are called
by some) that evolve due to supply/demand behavior are, for the
most part, the result of fundamentalists, speculators, technicians,
or whomever, putting their money to work based upon their established
convictions. Market (and stock) tend to move to extremes in a
psychological sense. On one end, you have "greed", which
is normally associated with a top (nobody left to buy), while
on the other extreme you have "fear" (nobody left to
sell). One technical theory that we have supported concerns the
"five-leg" pattern associated with a major trend, up
or down. As the discounting mechanism matures, and more believers
emerge to support a major trend, eventually the above extremes
are reached. Figure 1 attempts to portray the discounting scheme.
At first, as the stock begins to climb, the advance is fraught
with skeptics abounding. We call this the disbelief
phase (Leg 1). Profit taking develops (Leg 2), which in turn is
followed by another upturn (Leg 3). By now future fundamental
improvement may be more widely accepted (function of stock price?).
We call this the belief leg. Another correction
occurs (Leg 4) which is then followed by the "everyone's-got-to-own-it"
stage (greed - Leg 5). A major bear trend develops
most often with the opposite psychological implications. The stock
tops out when the fundamentals look good, and begins a serious
break which is not recognized by most as a new bear market (disbelief).
After a brief rally, a renewed trend of deterioration commences,
breaking the prior lows, and possibly accompanied by the first
tangible signs of fundamental (earnings) deterioration (belief).
The belief phase is finally a call to action - a recognition of
risk and a reversal of the immobilizing "deer frozen in the
headlight" disbelief phase. As the "belief" spreads,
more and more investor participants begin to take serious action
to preserve capital, and remaining positions are sold. Recognized
losses are offset by profit taking anywhere that gains remain
in place, putting all equities at risk of absolute price decline
(including those that have heretofore outperformed). Usually,
this stage will be expressed in media views like, "this is
the worst bear market in a generation". This belief phase
brings the structural bear market a step closer to its ultimate
low. But there is one final, third, phase on the way down. That
is the counterpart to the third and final phase on the way up,
the "greed" phase, for the structural bull trend - after
another short interim rally, the stock breaks down again, instituting
the fear syndrome (Leg 5). The common experience
is that of capitulation, when "the baby is thrown out with
the bath water" in a final fury of selling (margin calls
could very well play a role in such a trend, where stock is sold
to meet equity requirements). The fear phase generally incorporates
the final low (the first segment of the bear trend) and allows
the initiation of the second segment - the "repair"
years.

Assumption 2: Accumulation
precedes uptrends & Distribution precedes downtrends
This assumption should not be too difficult to understand
or accept as it deals with basic stock market dynamics or the
law of supply and demand. First, we should define the
terms that are used. We know there is a buyer for every seller
of stock. But one of these forces is usually stronger or more
influential - especially in the long run. For instance, if 50,000
shares of stock were to change hands on a downtick trade, especially
with a concession representing a large spread from the last sale,
we would consider that the seller was a stronger influence that
the buyer. For, if a buyer (or buyers) were all that anxious to
purchase the stock, it would be logical to expect that the trade
would have taken place with little or no concession of price at
all. In periods of a more vibrant market atmosphere, a trade would,
in all likelihood, occur on an uptick. A major concession in price
on a large block trade is usually looked upon as evidence of distribution,
and it can be a sign of the stock moving from strong to weak hands.
Accumulation by definition occurs when
a stock moves from weak to strong hands or, more importantly when
supply is eliminated from the marketplace.
Such a trade could take place on an uptick in price. Our second
assumption reads: before a stock experience a markup phase, whether
it be minor or major, a period of accumulation usually will take
place. Conversely, before a stock enters into a major or minor
downtrend, a period of distribution usually will be the preliminary
occurrence. Accumulation or distribution can occur within neutral
trading trends. Accumulation is often referred to as the building
of a "base", while a trend of distribution is also call
a "top". Obviously an uptrend in prices denotes on-balance
buying, while a downtrend is indicative of extreme supply. The
ability to analyze accumulation or distribution within neutral
price patterns is a price technical challenge. It can allow a
technician to anticipate a move, rather than wait to react to
a "breakout".
Assumption 3: The
Bigger the Base, the Higher in Space...
This third assumption is tied into the first two discussed. It
is an observation that can be readily made by any student willing
to expend the time and effort. It deals with the scope and extent
of market movements in relation to each other. As an example,
in most cases, a short phase of stock price consolidation - or
backing and filling - will be followed by a relative short-term
movement, up or down, in the stock's price. On the other hand,
a larger consolidation phase can lead to a greater stock price
move. Figure 2 should aid in the understanding of this assumption.
In Example A, the minor downtrend movement in price was followed
by a short-term consolidation phase before the stock began to
move up once again. In Example B, however, the downside adjustment
was somewhat more severe than in the former case and thus the
consolidation pattern was slightly longer in perspective. Example
C is an extreme, reflecting a major downward trend. Simply stated,
when the bulldozer, crane, steel ball, and wrecker visited this
scene, it took longer for the masons, plumbers, carpenters, and
electricians to accomplish their rebuilding process (see
also end note *, oded); the consolidation pattern
was of longer duration. Assumption 3 therefore states: Usually,
movements in the market tend to have a relationship to each other
- "the bigger the base, the higher in space; the bigger the
top, the bigger the drop; and the bigger the drop, the longer
the need for repair".

*
Why does it take so long to rebuilt the damage? Arnold Van den
Berg of Century Management explains
the fundamental basis of Shaw's observations, as follows: Rebuilding
takes so long because debt has to be liquidated and paid off,
companies have to be restored and the excess capacity that was
built up, has to be used up. So it takes many years, when you
have bubbles, to bring things back.
|
Smoke
and Mirrors? Charting and Technical Analysis
Both the anecdotal and the empirical evidence seem to suggest
that investors often are irrational, at least based upon the economic
definition of rationality. Consolidating all of the irrationalities
that have been attributed to financial markets, we have created
five groupings:
1) Market participants over react to new information.
2) Market participants are slow learners.
3) Investors change their minds frequently and often irrationally,
causing significant shifts in demand and supply, causing prices
to move.
4) There are a group of investors who lead markets, and finding
out when and what they are buying and selling can provide a useful
leading indicator of future price movements.
5) There are external forces that govern up and down movements
in markets that override fundamentals and investor preferences.
If we were to summarize
the assumptions that underlie technical analysis, we would list
the following:
1) Market value is determined solely by the interaction of supply
and demand.
2) Supply and demand are governed by numerous factors, both rational
and irrational. The market continually and automatically weighs
all these factors.
3) Disregarding minor fluctuations in the market, stock prices
tend to move in trends that persist for an appreciable length
of time.
4) Changes in trend are caused by shifts in demand and supply.
These shifts, no matter why they occur, can be detected sooner
or later in the action of the market itself. This is at the core
of technical analysis. Charts, the believers argue, send
advance warning of shifts in demand and supply in the form of
price and volume patterns.
|
Charting
and Technical Analysis, Damodaran
The Basis for Price Patterns: 1. Investors are not always rational
in the way they set expectations. These irrationalities may lead
to expectations being set too low for some assets at some times
and too high for other assets at other times. Thus, the next piece
of information is more likely to contain good news for the first
asset and bad news for the second. 2. Price changes themselves
may provide information to markets. Thus, the fact that a stock
has gone up strongly the last four days may be viewed as good
news by investors, making it more likely that the price will go
up today then down".
|
An
Evolutionary Approach to Technical Trading and Capital Market Efficiency,
Rode, Parikh, Friedman and Kane, 1995
"Because investors are prevented from making optimal decisions
they must use heuristic rules to guide their decision making. This
does not mean that their decision making is random or that it is
doomed to failure. In many cases, humans using heuristic rules can
perform quite well. This is the foundation of the theory: technical
trading rules represent efficient heuristic rules which can be used
to make reasonably good investing decisions. The object of technical
analysis is to predict a complex time series with one which is easier
to calculate and forecast. This is exactly the essence of simplifying
heuristic behavior: substitution of the less complex for the intractable.
Thus technical trading represents a "rational" choice
for boundedly rational investors. Technical trading can
allow investors to make reasonably well-informed decisions with
relatively small information processing costs. Various
work has been done on the predictive power of technical analysis
(e.g., Neftci, 1991; Blume, Easeley, and O'Hara, 1994) and the results
have generally been supportive of the technical rule approach. It
is clearly conceded that technical analysis doesn't not produce
optimal results". |
Foundations
of Technical Analysis: Computational Algorithms, Statistical Inference,
and Empirical Implementation, Lo, Mamaysky and Wang, 2000
Technical analysis, also known as "charting", has been
part of financial practice for many decades, but this discipline
has not received the same level of academic scrutiny and acceptance
as more traditional approaches such as fundamental analysis. One
of the main obstacles is the highly subjective nature of technical
analysis - the presence of geometric shapes in historical price
charts is often in the eyes of the beholder. In this paper, we propose
a systematic and automatic approach to technical pattern recognition
using non parametric kernel regression, and apply this method to
a large number of U.S. stocks from 1962 to 1996 to evaluate the
effectiveness to technical analysis. By comparing the unconditional
empirical distribution of daily stock returns to the conditional
distribution - conditioned on specific technical indicators such
as head-and-shoulders or double bottoms - we find that over the
31-year sample period, several technical indicators do provide incremental
information and may have some practical value". |
Does
Intraday Technical Analysis in the U'S' Equity Market Have Value?,
Marshall, Cahan and Cahan, 2006
This paper investigates whether intraday technical analysis is profitable
in the U.S. equity market. Surveys of market participants indicate
that they place more emphasis on technical analysis (and less on
fundamental analysis) the shorter the time horizon; however, the
technical analysis literature to date has focused on long-term technical
trading rules. We find, using two bootstrap methodologies, that
none of the 7,846 popular technical trading rules we test are profitable
after data snooping bias is taken into account. There is no evidence
that the market is inefficient over this time horizon. (see 2008
extended study) |
How
to reconcile Market Efficiency and Technical Analysis, Ilinskaia
and Ilinski, 1999
"Weak form of the Efficiency Market Hypothesis says that the
all relevant information came from historical data is encoded in
the current price and, hence, the only ingredient which is able
to influence the future prices is a new information. The information
is unpredictable and random. This excludes predictions of future
market movements from historical data, i.e. makes the technical
analysis out of law. However the technical analysis is widely used
by traders and speculators who steadily refuse to consider the market
as a "fair game" and survive with such believe. In the
paper we make a conjecture that TA and EMH correspond to different
time regimes". |
The
Mechanisms of Market Inefficiency: An Introduction to the New Finance,
STOUT, 2004
"During the 1970s and early 1980s, the Efficient Capital Market
Hypothesis (ECMH) became one of the most widely-accepted and influential
ideas in finance economics. More recently, however, the idea of
market efficiency has fallen into disrepute as a result of market
events and growing empirical evidence of inefficiencies. This Article
argues that the weaknesses of efficient market theory are, and were,
apparent from a careful inspection of its initial premises, including
the presumptions of homogeneous investor expectations, effective
arbitrage, and investor rationality. By the same token, a wide range
of market phenomena inconsistent with the ECHM can be explained
using market models that modify these three assumptions. In illustration,
this Article explores three important strands of today's finance
literature: (1) the expanding body of work on asset pricing when
investors have heterogeneous expectations; (2) recent theoretical
and empirical scholarship on how and why arbitrage may move certain
types of publicly available information into price more slowly and
incompletely than earlier writings suggested; and (3) the exploding
literature in behavioral finance, which examines what happens to
prices when market participants do not all share rational expectations.
Taken together, these three bodies of work show signs of providing
the essential framework on which can be built a new and more powerful
working model of securities markets". |
The
Value of Technical Analysis, Roberts, 2002
Even though there is little academic research that supports the
usefulness of technical analysis, its use remains widespread in
financial markets. One explanation previously offered is the ability
of technical methods to identify periods of high volatility. The
results indicate that highly risk-averse agents could significantly
benefit from technical strategies. |
In
Defense of Technical Analysis: Discussion, SORENSEN, 1985
"This paper has shown that past prices, when combined with
other valuable information, can indeed be helpful in achieving unusual
profit. However, it is the nonprice information that creates the
opportunity. The past prices serve only to permit its efficient
exploitation". |
Partial
Revelation of Information in Experimental Asset Markets, COPELAND
and FRIEDMAN, 1991
"The logical basis for technical analysis is that shifts in
asset supply or demand are not instantaneous but rather take some
time to complete themselves. Technical indicators are intended to
detect such shifts while they are still underway". |
Foreign
Exchange Rate Forecasting Techniques: Implications for Business
and Policy, GOODMAN, 1978
"On average, the economics-oriented services do rather poorly
over the relatively short-time horizon considered in this study.
All the technically-oriented services do remarkably well. The average
performance of the poorest technically-oriented services is far
better than the average performance of the best economics-oriented
services". |
Technical
Analysis in the Foreign Exchange Market: A Layman's Guide, NEELY,
1997
"The weight of the evidence now suggests that excess returns
have been available to technical foreign exchange traders over long
periods. Risk is hard to define and measure, however, and this difficulty
has obscured the degree of inefficiency in the foreign exchange
market. There is no guarantee, of course, that technical rules will
continue to generate excess returns in the future; the excess returns
may be bid away by market participants. Indeed, this may already
be occurring". |
|
Exploring
the Fuzzy Nature of Technical Patterns of U.S Stock Market,
Dong and Zhou
"Technical analysis has been a part of financial practice for
many decades. One of the most challenging areas in technical analysis
is the automatic detection of technical patterns that are similar
in the eyes of expert investors. In this paper, we propose a fuzzy
logic based approach for technical analysis. By introducing the
inter & intra fuzzification into an automatic pattern detection
and analysis process, we incorporate human cognitive uncertainty
into the technical analysis domain". |
[Cutler
et al.] Several studies of asset pricing have challenged the view
that stock prices movements are wholly attributable to the arrival
of news. The apparent absence of fundamental economic news coincident
with the dramatic stock market movements of late 1987 is particularly
difficult to reconcile with the standard view - that fluctuations
in asset pricing are attributable to changes in fundamental values.
Our results suggest the difficulty of explaining as much as half
of the variance in aggregate stock prices on the basis of publicly
available news bearing on fundamental values. Volatility may reflect
changes that take place in average assessments of given sets of
information regarding fundamental values as investors re-examine
existing data or present new arguments. Small changes in the supply
of or demand for securities can have large effects on prices. If
many investors accept market prices as indicators of value and so
do not trade on the basis of their own assessment of values, market
values will be more susceptible to those who trade on the basis
of their own opinions. |
Stock
trade patterns could predict financial earthquakes, MIT News,
2003
Large-scale events in the stock market adhere to distinct patterns.
The patterns found by the scientists are "power laws",
which describe mathematical relationships between the frequency
of large and small events. In short, the scientists have shown that
stock markets have a mathematical elegance frequently found in natural
systems. "We have found that the artificial world of the financial
markets follows a pattern similar to one found in our natural world.
Trading on the stock market has a lot of randomness, but at the
end of the day you find that a pattern emerges that matches power-law
patterns found empirically in data from systems as diverse as earthquakes
and human language. The scientists show that--for the market as
a whole and for an individual stock--the daily volume of stocks
traded, number of trades and price fluctuations follow power laws.
For example, the number of days when a particular stock price moves
by 1 percent will be eight times the number of days when that stock
moves by 2 percent, which will in turn be eight times the number
of days when that stock moves by 4 percent, which will in turn be
eight times the number of days that stock moves by 8 percent, and
so on". see the Nature
article |
המונופול
על המידע, איתן אבריאל, דה-מרקר, 29/3/2004
"הבנקים הגדולים, למשל, יודעים טוב יותר מאחרים מה קורה בשוק,
מכיוון ששטף הפעולות שהם מבצעים מול הלקוחות שלהם, מול הבנקים הזרים
ומול הבנקים המקומיים מספק להם מידע עודף על הלך הרוחות הכללי, וגם
על קיומם של מוכרים או קונים גדולים העשויים להשפיע על שער הדולר בכיוון
זה או אחר. ככל שהבנק גדול יותר והיקף הפעילות שהוא מבצע גדול יותר
- כך המידע שבידיו רב יותר, ולכן סיכוייו לסיים את יום המחר ברווח
טובים יותר. כך ברור שכל שחקן ... סובל מנחיתות מידע, שתבוא במקרים
רבים על חשבונו". |
|